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THU MONETAHY SYSTEM OF LESOTHO;
AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS *
Lesotho has be?en using a foreign currency as its own medium 
of exchange and store of value since general purpose money was 
introduced in the country by Europeans at the beginning of the 
19th Century, This situation prevailed in all other colonial and 
ex-colonial countries the world over at the early stages of colonial 
regimes. However, many of these peripheral states later on 
established what became known as the Currency Board Monetary system. 
At the time of political independence, or just before, most of the 
ex-colonial states introduced relatively more independent Monetary 
systems than the currency board one. Thus, it could be said that 
political independence was the most important event which caused 
the creation of central banks in most of the relevant states.
.
Indeed, such actions were regarded by many monetary experts from
%
the metropolitan centres as mere expression of sovereignty which
2had no economic significance. Other writers view the creation 
of central banks in these countries before significant development 
of the indigenous financial structure as an - "active”
I
behaviour ejhich should be conducive to the promotion of 
economic development.^
The material in this article is based on an earlier
i
unpublished paper and on the writer1 s M.Fhi’l. thesis at the 
University of Leeds.
1. Newlyn, U.T. and Ro.vsfy D.C., Money and Banking in British Colonial
 ^ . Africa ^London, Oxford University Press
2. Johnson, H.G., Further. Essays in Monet, ry Economics 195^) 
(London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972), pp. 223 - 228.
3. .Sayers, R.3., Control Ucnkinn After Ganehot (Uxford at the
Clarendon Press 1957). chnntrv
Lesotho is one of the very feu countries' which continues to 
use the mast rigid foreign currency monetary system long after 
political independence* +
The South African currency was marie legal tender in Lesotho
in 1932, without any formal monetary agreement. It was not until
1December, 197A that a formal monetary Agreement Lies signed.
However, as will be shown below, the agreement still leaves the 
basic features of the foreign currency system intact.
The aim of this study is to examine the costs and benefits
of such a dependent monetary system from Lesotho’s point of view,-
For an application of the theory of optimum currency cress to
2the Rand Monetary area, see the writer's earlier paper. The 
approach here is to assess the costs and benefits of the present 
currency arrangements within the framework of the theoretical 
functions of the central banking monetary system, in underdeveloped: f • ■ * *
. 3  'economies, a ; •; ;u .
If EUOL-LJTIG?: ^  FUFCTIlTvIG GF GCiRTRML 3 AM MS
According to Hoyok the first use of the term “Central 
Bank” was that mode by the Saint-Simonicts in 1029 and 1930 when 
they were planning the reorganization of the banking system.
However, the concept of central bonking envisaged then bears 
very little relationship to the current concept which has 
evolved through experience,
1 e Monetary Agreement 3-a-twgen the Governments' of Lesotho, South 
Africa and Swaziland,(becomber, 197A).
2, "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas end the Rand," Rhodesian 
Journal of Economic voi* £, no, 2 (June 1972), pp. A9-53.
3, This approach hog employed by the writer in the unpublished
M.Phil, Thesis: "The Development of the'■•Monetary t'conomy ond 
anRAnolysis’of thq Monetary and Financial System in the Republic 
of 3otswano," The University of Leeds, 197G ch.. JJI., Substantial, 
parts of this paper ere drown from this’work, , • =
A. Hayck, F.A., v. "The Counter-Revolution of Scienp.e". Economic# •
Vol. 0 (Hay 19A1), p. 1A5. .........* • '
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As Professor Sayers puts it,
)
"Before 1900, tha development nf central banking was 
almost entirely empirical™ Ideao on tha subject sprang 
largely from the efforts of the Bank of England to deal 
with practical problems.”1
tJhat then are the functions of a modern central bank? A
2list and discussion of these functions can be found in Fleetwood 
and IMeulyn.^ For our purposes here we shall examine the costs and 
benefits of the absence of a central bank in Lesotho within the 
framework of tha following functions of such an institution in a 
developing economy:
1. Sole issuer of elastic currency.
2. Creation and control of money and credit. „
3. Lender-of-last-Resort.
A. Engine of growth of other financial institutions.
5. Banker to Government and other institutions,
6. Manager of exchange - rates and - controls.
7. Stimulation of National Savings for productive investment.
G. Economic research and financial planning.
1. Sayers, R.S., "Central Banking” in International Encyclopedia 
□ f Social Sciences. V/ol.2, p. 1.
2. Fleetwood, E.E., Money and Finance in Africa (N.Y. Frederick A. 
Praeger 196A) pp. 67-68
3. Newlyn, U.T., Money in an African Context (Nairobi, Oxford 
University Press 1967) pp. 71-79
„11 • the CD5TS GF THE FDREIGK CU.:. ^EI\iCV 3Y3TEK 
/ The first cast to Lesotho far the use of a foreign issued 
currency us her domestic currency is connected uith the factors 
behind changes in money supply. Currency is imported into Lesotho 
in exchange for exports of goods nd services (EX) 'and os o result 
of inflow of capital funds from abroad (hi). The same currency 
leaves the country as a result of importation of goods end services 
(IK) and outflows of capital funds (KL). Therefore, the annual 
increments in EX and hi increase the stock of the Hand currency 
in the country while increments in IK and KG reduce the currency 
stock.
Given the fractional reserve banking principle, the changes 
in money sunaly (demand deposit component) are caused by
changes in bank lending to the Government n^ci the private sector.
This is generally called domestic credit expansion (DC). The 
complete money stock (KG) marginal relation in Lesotho can be
,
written as in any economy with an independent monetary system as:j
A  P O O  =  - h  A N  k l - h  A  b C  —  A L M
where KO = Currency plus deposits
■ (\1K I = net capital inf leu 5 1
the rest as defined above. . .
f
The social cost here results from the: f «ct that .a large port
or the export element in the currency imported is obtained by giving
! ’ ; -
up real goads and services when- in practice that- part of the currency 
could be issued without giving up these real resources. This type 
of currency has bean called fiduciary issue. This means that there 
is currency circul:ting in Lesotho which will never be converted
into foreign currencies. The real goods and services backing this
possible fiduciary issue are clearly bain; hoarded. The opportunity 
cost of hoarding thr'se resources is th.. number of productive projects 
(and number of iobs nnrf nutnut) nn-*- ri n-prcd.
The second source of costs to Lasctnc is connected with the 
inability of the system to provide sufficient elasticity in thg 
supply of currency to meat wide seasonal fluctuations in the demand 
for currency or the medium of exchange in nenanl. Inelasticity in 
tho supply of currency is incrrjscad by rbsense of swift and cheap 
moans of transport and cnmmuniceuians end by tha absence of bank 
offices in the larger part of the country.
Evidence available shows that many Lesotho producers in tho 
hinterl-nd have to wait for two or so months for their receipts from 
sale of mohair. In the meantime, any iwprovem .nto in their 
production for the next market must h ■ suspended. Vary often the 
producers are forced to sell their products to local traders 
for immediate cosh but at usurious discounts.-
The benefits . :riv d from the use of money are bound to be
reduced in an economy characterised by shortages nf c^sh. Further,
them mill ho a redistribution of th :se benefits from those poorer
communities to the urban arrr-o whore not only currency is readily
available hue where cheque book money is used widely. Jith
reference to the period when Arnrnc used European currencies as medium 
of exchange,
"The burden of the in:lssticity of note issues, 
resulting unrh? th g.v.-n circumstances in n p.- rtiol 
inelasticity of lusn hi. funds, fell on those sections 
of thC 'Country which mere net swfvici :ntly developed 
to find a way cut'by using deposit money instead of 
banknotes."1
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1 • bePilch, F. jlr: holding ~f:' American bonking: Man anri Ideas, 
(Now York end Lor. ’on, John n It” VI) he 1. ilf p„ 12D.
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The soninl cost involve!.'- .choul;’ not be- unfcrosti.. tocl 
beer use* the rr.ejority of peoplo in rur 1 Lesotho h v;. m  uecrsc 
to deposit money.
The third form of enrt tn Lesotho is the foregone net 
incline- which crises from th im nuf :cturo «:if currency. Since 
currunc.y is not! issu•:>cl the m;>r.li::.nvnr un0cir rnnrpc-1 y none!itione, 
no-Tly '.11 c;:ntnl b enks ore rn; ,1cinj profits ( lthough they -ire 
supposed to he non-profit motivated) on verious accounts.
One fern of income forononti •* . Lucatho in suiuniorrgc 
which m y  issuer of currency must eerru It in dr fin :rf • a the 
difference bo ewe: on th won it-tv v I lk* f currency ’ n - the 
v' lus of row ;n?.tori Is use" in th in nuf o'suro of the currency. 
The -wncunt of seignior one f or:.: on nr by Li : on the;, (un to 1972) con 
be represented by the folln-jinn ex re i~r.:
I
C  _ _ i C ^  r~ i )X -
t - o  u—
'Shorn 3 = not scinnior-.pc
C = currency outstanding t tine tnr- of e eh period,
\'t = Coot of monuf cturinp th : increment; 1 currency.
The sinnificnncc of t'is sourer of revenue con be riiscornid from
the following leer 1 prevision b.-- th 3iuth Afric n Government:
’'The minister of Finuncu nry ... pm/ to -nv oth r otete 
such portion cf the profit deriv >d from th-. i,r nuf octure, 
in the hrotoric hr- nch of th:. bv-1 Li5.hi; , of silver 
end copper coins issuer- therefrom fur use in such stotc, 
os r.rsy be anraed upon between tin sold minister nnt the 
uovernment of sueh st o.5:1
ThG union Piner;ci-?1 Pdpu-t, i ;n :r -,cof fa. 3A of 1330, 
Section 1(1).
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over the period 1070 to 1937 the rote of seigniorage at the
,2Royal Lint ranged from 9,09'j to 529,87?!i .
A more important source of revenue which Lesotho lost for 
several decodes is the backing of currency in circulation. 
Instead cf holding the d.and, Lesotho could hove issued her oun 
local currency and used the Rond withdrawn from circuletion to
net income from this investment account con be represented by the 
following, expression:
liihere Y = sum of net income: foregone up to (1972)
C = currency outstanding at the end of period t, 
i = current rate of return on earning assets
even if Lesotho decided to convert nil the Rond withdrawn from 
circulation into noId, she would have earned the largo capital 
gains from the recent incresss in the price of Cold. In fact, 
South Africa has held a very high proportion of its foreign assets 
in form of gold partly because the interest income from foreign 
Exchange investment uas believed to Lie much less than the 
capital gains from the probable rise in the price of gold.'*
1* Ihid. section 1(2).
2» Annual Reports of the bs^u';y Raster and Comptroller of the
3. Fran son Commission Report, 197C1, p. 261. The other reason is 
the fear of having her foreign assets frozen for political—
Royal Mint, 1935-1936
-G- . .
3v virtue of its role ag a pool of cash reserves of the
economy; and o creator of money a central sank is placed in a
strong position to earn interest income on advances end discounts
to the private sector (vis financial institutions or directly)
and the public sector. The 197k Sand Monetary Agreement actually
has made it ussier for the above sectors to borrow from abroad,
which implies larger payments of interest to South African 
1residents. Since nearly half of local deposits end up in 
South rtfrica through the financial system, Lesotho is actually
paying interest on its own resources to foreigners.
Lesotho due to the.
• i ho fourth f o m  of revenue lost by / use of a foreign
n
currency as her circulating medium is the inflation tax"' which
the economy is paying to the issuer of the Hand currency - the
South Africen Government* The-amount of inflation tax revenue 
can be represented by the following expression:
H  =  d £
K P
Whore R = inflation tax revenue
dP - rate of inflation which is the tax rate.
P ‘
C_ = real stock oL currency in circulation which is the
P base of the tax.
1. Monetary agreement, 197k, Article k.
2. Friedman, n., ’'Government Revenue from Inflation'1,
• Journal of Political Gconqmy vol. 79, (duly/August 1971), 
pp. Gkb - C5S.
If and when Lesotho issues her own currency, this revenue will he 
received by the Lesotho Government,, Should the inflation rate 
be very high, then from this revenue must be subtracted the 
loss to society resulting from reduction in the demand for 
currency and therefore reduction in the benefits derived from 
the use of currency. This form of tax revenue can he significant 
if the rate of inflation is moderate (thot is up to 10't) . ~
Neulyn puts the limit at 30va.^  However, since the tax base 
(ratio of money to income) is smaller in economies with large 
non-monetcry sectors, this form of tax revenue be very small.
Since the rate of inflation in the Rand monetary area
rose un to a muximum of lligib and has never reached the iMoulyn
limit, it can be inferred thot Lesot o has indeed not only lost
substantial inflation tax revenue but, as holder of Rand Cureency,
has also paid inflation tax to the more developed neighbour.Qiven
an estimated real stock of currency in circulation in Lesotho 
as at 3 1st December,1973 of about R11,0 million-1', the gross
inflation tax revenue involved here is about Rl,5f- million at
5a rate of inflation of iLi. ,0%* 
l*3ailey,M,J."The Welfare Cost of Inflationary F i n a n c e , The 
Journal of Political Economy,vol.LXIV, 1956,pp.93“H O •
2.Johnson,H.G.5ssays in Monetary Economics,(London,George Allen 
Unwin Lt d,, 19bT) pT2Bri. 7 * '
3*ITewlyn,W»T* Financing Economic Developnm t, (Forthcoming)
l|*197U Monetary Agreement,Article 6 (Id) gives a nominal 
stock of currency of RIP,5 million.
5 .This cost is not taken into account by the formula for 
compensatory payments to Lesotho and Swaziland as provided 
by Article 6.
The sura of the above revenues foregone has been reduced as 
of 1st January,1972,From this ' date, Lesotho has been receiving
Wt*
annual revenues equal to two thirds of the product of the
prevailing yield on South African Government bonds and the
agreed estimated currency in circulation in Lesotho.This amounts
to about R1 million per year, and is said to represent a return
on the Rand currency circulating in Lesotho,'*’ According to our
analysis here, this compensation may not even cover the net
seigniorage plus income from the currency fund investment.For
one thing, the stock of currency in circulation could be much
higher than is used in the formula.Secondly, the costs of
management of the currency suggested by the formula nay not be
as high as one third.
The third point is that(as indicated by table l),if Lesotho
had an independent currency and therefore freedom of choice,
there is no doubt that she would most probably invest at least
higher yield
part of the currency backing in/united Kingdom Government bonds.
i
Table 1
- 10 -
. . ----South
Africa
(fo)
Japan
(i)
United 
Kingdom 
(m)
United States 
of America
tm
Differential 
S. A. — U.K.
6,13 ~o,l o 6,91 5 , 6 3 -0,7B
1973 6,00 7,26 10,72 6 , 3 0 -2,72
1971+ 9,50 9,26 V+, 77 6 , 9 9 -5,27
1975 10,00 n ♦ a. 11+, 39 6,90 -l+,39
Int ernat i onaf Financ iaj~stat i sti c s, March, 1976 •
The sum of the inflation tax,capital gains from the recent
l6r; to 20>o rise in the price of Gold for monetary use,and intere
« , * 
sb income from discounts, advances and loans is still being lost
by Lesotho as a result of her membership of the Rand
Currency Union.
1. 197U Monetary Agreement,Article 6 (la).
T
'X
Tho Fourth cost to Lesotho arises from the inability of the 
authorities to create money and credit in order to facilitate growth 
of national income. The need to creat money and credit is generated 
by the failure of the economy to produce sufficient savings to finance 
domestic investment, 1 The inelastic supply of goods in a country like 
Lesotho may obviate he need to create money. Nevertheless, when the 
need to create money arises, the author ities should be in a position 
to do so in the national interest.
The absence of a lender-of-last resort in Lesotho has depriv' d the 
economy of an important instrument for the promotion of the sound 
development of indigenous producers of goods financial institutions
f f jt . i ' , ' V *• ’r'-\and financial'assets. Without an institution equipped with unlimited 
powers to supply liquidity for the whole economy in the event of economic 
and financial criso the economy is exposed to damaging deflationary 
pressures.
Empirical evidence exists showing that the Lesotho farmers, traders
and consumers co-operative movement since 1 9 3 1* has been seriously
constrained by shortage of liquidity and lack of sound financial management 
2guidance. With respect to marketing societies there was,
’’Considerable delay between the time the members 
delivered the wocl/mohair to the society and the day 
on which they received, payment. In order to avoid this 
constraint societies needed finance to give advances to 
members while awaiting the sale of wool/mohair at the coast,”3
1, Newlyn, W,T, Financial For De -elopment (l' j^) p, 6l,
2, Co-cp Division, Annual Report 1975 pp 1 - 3.
3, Ibid., p.l.
Z -1 2-
This legitimate need for credit was partially met by the establishment
of the Basutbland CO-operative Bonking Union (B.C.B.U,) in 1957* 'fRe
main objective was to finance primary societies for agricultural credit,
marketing of agricultural produce and bulk purchasing of goods in
order to take advantage of cash discounts.^ The relative importance sources 
of funds required to meet this objective can be seen from Table 2. The heavy 
un expensive lean finance was clearly one of the most serious weaknesses of
the BCBU. Secondly, some of those funds were employed in long-term
projects which reduced the liquidity of the institution. In 1963? the
■BCBU was dissolved,
’’ ... because of serious financial problems which
had been caused by misappropriation of funds, M
According a credit expert to Lesotho, if all depositors with the B.C.B.U. 
were to demand immediate withdrawal the position would have been very 
serious.
What is not mentioned ae orro of the cause« of failure of the
B.C,3.TJ. is that in the absence of sharp competition from foreign 
commercial banks (backed by powerful lenders—of—last resort), this 
indigenous banking concern would have had more profitable business and 
the liquidity problem would have been substantially reduced#
In short, this indigenous banking concern lacked both liquidity and 
sound financial management, A lender of last resort would have guaranteed 
adequate liquidity and would have necessarily laid down sounder financial 
management rules. The failure of i^ he BCBU had two effects. Firstly 
it reduced economic activity in Lesotho to some extent since this 
institution had become the basic source of liquidity for the entire
m
1# Ibid. p.3.
2# Co-op Division, Annual Report, 1 9 7 5 p. 3
vn
Basutoland Co-operative Banking Union Ltd. Sources of 
Funds as at End of year 1961/62
Amount Percent of
Total 
(R) {%)
1* Overdraft at Barclays Bank 300 000 45? &
(a) Garanteed "by British
Government^ 2000000)
(h) Guaranteed by Lesotho 
Government( 100 000)
2. American Revolving Loan 173 500 26,5
3. Loans From Internal Sources 69 000  ^ 10,5
(a) Basutoland National
Treasury(l5 000)
(b) Basutoland Co-operative
Savings Society(47 000)
4. Deposits, Investments and Share
Capital 72 700 ■ 1 1 ,1
• Gifts from Oxfac 40 000 6,1
655 200 100,0
M  TOTAL
Cooperative movement. Secondly, the development of an indigenous 
banking and 'financial system was^seriously retarded, thus increasing 
the public’s confidence in foreign banks which have consistently acted 
negatively to the development of the Lesotho’s infant monetary economy.
Recently, (October 197<0 "the indigenous Lesotho Bank;National 
Development Bank started operations in the absence of a lender—of—last 
resort. The bank was equipped legally with powers to act in an active 
or supply-loading manner in agriculture, local industry, commerce and
tourism} A study of the operations of this bank shows that the institu­
tion has been transformed into a commercial bank doing very little 
development banking. Its liquid assets deposit ratio was as high
as 103,7$ in 1975 and 94>5t» in 197c. If migrant workers doforrcd pay fund
is included in the dcnominatarthe corresponding ratios are 54.9$ and
2 •50,6$. " . The- e developments, .the change from development banking to
commercial banking and the maintenance of high liquid asset ratios arc 
quite consistent with the circumstances within which the institution is 
operating. Without the backing of on indigenous a lender of last 
resort, it would be bad banking business for the bank to act otherwise.
Another reason advanced for the above behaviour is that the 
bank_ is having severe staffing problems. The central bank or lender 
of last resort wo have in mind here is expected to provide not only 
finance but also financial management services to the institutions it 
lends-funds. . .........
It should be noted, however, that according to the 1974 Rand 
Monetary Agreement, the Lesotho, and Swaziland authorities can ma,ke 
an arrangement with the Government of South Africa whereby the latter,
1. First Five-Year National Development Plan 197C- 7 5  PP 211-212.
2. Deferred Pay Fund increased from R6, 6 million in 1975 
to RIO,3 million in 1976.
-tLb77
M .... shall in speci"1! circumstances 
cause the South African Reserve Bank 
in its capacity as lender of last resort 
to make available to either such 
Government temporary^ central banking 
credit facilities in*such forms and 
amounts and on such berms as may he 
agreed upon at the time, ”1
Whether the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) can be taken as a true
lender of last resort for Lesotho's economy or. not will--depend on
what is meant by- special circumstances. It is very unlikely that the
inducement and encouragement of the rapid develop of indigenous
and
financial institutions^domestic enterprises in Lesotho could be 
accepted as a special case deserving central banking credit support.
In an underdeveloped economy, the central bank has to be much closer 
to productive units than in an advanced economy. That the SARB is 
not really regarded as a reliable lender of last resort for the entire 
economy is confirmed by the following Quotations
"The present ratio (of local lonns to deposits of
commercial banks) may be considered low in
comp- —'iiison with many other countries. However, in view 
of the absence of a central bank as a lender of 
last resort the lower ratio in Lesotho provides 
an additional safety margin which is needed.M 2
The point here is that the sort of lender of last resort erT.isaged in 
the 1974 Monetary Agreement cannot be the one designed for the promotion 
of economic development in the poorer member countries.
a
The next important loss from the absence of a full-central 
banking concern in Lesotho is the higher costs of borrowing funds 
(by the Government itself) than if such an institution existed’. 
Governments with central banks practically rjay zero rate of interest 
when they^borrow from the latter. .The Lesotho Government must pay a 
rate greater than zero since it has to borrow from commercial banks 
which charge a rate of 1 , 5 $  above the South African Reserve Bank rate.
1. 1974 R^nd Monetary Agreement, op.cit. Article 4(4). Underlining is 
my own.
2. Registrar of Financial Institutions, Annual Report, 1976, n.6.
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Tho magnitude of the cost involved here can be discerned from table %  
For an underdeveloped economy, teis cost should not bo underestimated.
Table 3«
The 5AKB Rate and Rate of Interest By the Lesotho Government 
End of Bank Rate
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
(*)
(1)
5.5
5.5
5.5
6.5 
6,0
5.5 
8,0
Rate Paid B y 7 
Lesotho Government
(*)
(2)
7 .0
I , G
7.0
8.0
7.5 
7,0
9.5
Government 
advances from 
Commercial banks
(ROQC)
(3)
336 .0
444.0
Source % SARB, Qu o r t S I  y Bulletin 1974 <& 197^ for Column (l). Lesotho 
Authorities for columns (2) and (3),Harch,197S.
On this account, the coses to the Government of Lesotho and the economy
clearly exceed the benefits (if any) The amounts of borrowing constituted
about 1 ,1$ of the average overall. doficit1for period 1966/67 - 1968/69
and 7,0$ over the period 1969/70 - 197l/72. Thus, such borrowing fr<~>m
the central bank could not have beer, inflationary. As we indicated above,
a moderate rate inflation in any oaso would have transfeired;-re^l
resources from money holders to the Government for development purposes..
1. Current and capital expenditure minus current receipts.
Prom the point of view of-the-economy as a whole, it has been 
observed that for many underdeveloped economics, a central bank was 
regarded,
"As an agency for bringing about an era of 
low interest rates and the rapid development 
of the resources of the country.
The low interest rate policy suggested here is onl; appropriate . to the 
"small man" who constitute the majority of people in Lesotho, It would 
be inefficient to apply it to more prosperous borrowers.
The outflow of surplus funds from Lesotho due mainly to the
absence of an indigenous banker to the Government and other financial
institutions is another source of losses to the Lesotho economy. The
funds so exported earn income which acrucs to foreign shareholders
theof the private foreign financial institutions. To extent that some 
nationals also invest their surplus funds outside th£ economy, the 
higher interest income earned abroad may be an important addition to 
the national income. However, the development of a growing stock of 
liquid . financial assets is clearly more important than private 
interest income.
Another important point here is that the banker to the Government 
also advises the latter in all financial matters. In the absence of 
such an institution, a foreign private bank has been playing this role, 
in its own private interest, of course.
We now turn to an extremely important function of a central bank 
in underdeveloped economies.
It is now generally accepted that.the - inducement of the development 
of sound--local( financial institutions is one of the most important supply- 
leading development functions of a central reserve bank in financially
- 17 -
1. Sen, S. N. Central Banking i i rloveloped Money Market!Calcutta,1967)
n.230
developing economies, 1 First, we should examine the case for active
* ° f  '
indigenous financial systems in 'vcvelopin^ countries.
The theory of finance toils us that the greater the financial
intermediation, the larger will be the volume of national savings
for economic development and the more convenient and cheaper the iin-nee 
2to borrovro.
Although foreign financial institutions have existed in most
developing countries of Africa, these have not been successful in
achieving the objectives assigned to financial intermediation. The
basic reason is that the foreign private financial institutions operating
in Africa have a structure, specialism, orientation and philosophy
which are not tailored to the mobilization and productive utilization
a
of domestic financial resources within a developing economy. Indigenous 
financial instituti .ns help to broaden the financial structure in 
order to provide avenues for effective utilization of domestically- 
generated investible funds. Public and private indigenous financial
I
institutions arc likely to "ee more responsive to the. call for national
I
economic development than foreign owned and managed ones. For one thing 
indigenous managers are subject tc domestic laws and for another they 
ihave' naturally closer tics with the masses of users of financial 
services.I
For these basic reasons, the deliberate development of active
I . \
local financial institutions is essential for economic development,However,
- 18 -
1. Patrick, 1966,Cp.Cit.,fR,Goldsmith,”Centr-l Banks and Financial 
Institutions” ins D. ?drivino(El). Fiscal  ^nd h nrtvry Problems in Developing 
States: The Proceeding of th~ . -1 'v-td C-nferenco. (HewYork.Praegcr 
Publishers, 19 6 7 ) chapter 22. $ A. r.Dri: ner,"Central Banking and Economic 
Development” -Journal of Money, Cr lit -nd Panking (November 1971),
pp.780-792.
2. Furness, B.L.,An Introduction to earracial Economics (London, Heinemann, 
1972J : U. Tan ¥ai FinancF1 Ir.tcr. A ri s nd A- tio-n-.l Savings in
....Dc-.v-C-loeir.g Countries (London, Preaper Publishers, 1972)p.lll.
3. . uh.,ECii, Saving’s Iv-bil ization 1. . A eel opine African Countries 
Addis Jibaba, 12 Tdyvcmber 1973) E/ c  e 1 ;/H0U/l07, p. 29
"Without an effective lender of last resort it is 
unrealistic to hope for the development of indig..nous 
banks in small cconomios in the face of stiff 
competition from the entrenched branches of inter­
national banks. " -1
development of local credit institutions.
The situation in Lesotho is very critical in that the bulk of 
total domestic deposits is collected by the two foreign commercial banks, 
building society agencies and insurance companies. Thus, banking power 
is completely in the hands of foreign financial institutions. For this 
reason, th^y pose an effective threat to any private indigenous 
commercial bank which may bo established.
If a central bank existed in Lesotho with an objective of inducing 
'rapid development of indigenous institutions, it would have to
2protect the local banks against competition from the foreign ones.
The ^infant ban!-:" protection can take different forms, including 
subsidization, granting them monopoly in certain areas of business, tax 
concessions, and turning them into bankers of public institutions.
It may bo argued that there is no need for a central bank for 
the particular purpose of promoting the development of local financial 
development institutions because the Government of Lesotho has actually 
created the Post Office Savings Bank,the Lesotho National Development 
Corporation and the national Development Bank without a central bank. 
However, it is generally recognised that the efficient inducement and 
control of financial institutions requires an institution whose staff 
has a common background with that of staff of other institutions whose 
day t*‘ day o- prati nr are -imil r. ^  In this car a central bank is the 
most editable enterprise to develop and control indigenous financial 
institutions,
1, McLeod, A., "The British Currency — boar*d system — Successes
_ and short-coffiin •" The Banker. Vol. 125, 1975>pp.247-252.
2. Griffithsp3L_-.nvisAbTil. Barri to Invisible Trade (London,* 1975) 
3* Lowlyn,W.T.,Report on .Ten: : . e ;)nlicy in Uganda Unpublished (May 1959)
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For example, the situation whore indigenous financial institutions 
find themselves depositing huge Reserves with foreign hanks, whoso 
TGBtn-ont behaviour is negatively responsive 'and was the very reason 
for establishing local banks of a different type, is clear evidence 
for the failure by the Government of Lesotho to correct the exploitative 
and inefficient financial system. Only a central banking system is 
likely to.promote a • sound and efficient indigenous financial system.
The basic point hero is that the absence of a central bank in 
Lesotho has deprived the present indigenous credit institutions of a 
reliable and effective lender of last resort. . s a result, their 
impact has been limited. That none of the Government financial institu­
tions has yet collapsed is because they have been extremely cautious 
in the absence of ultimate re-discounting facilities. As a monetary 
commission to Cuba also observed,
"This lack of ro—discounting facilities has doubtless 
been one of the factors retarding the development 
of Cuban-owned banks"!
Actually most of the Cuban banks did collapse in 1920 in the
2fa.ee of severe insufficiency of liquidity. Most of the Nigerian 
indigenous banks had collapsed by 1954 due basically to shortage of 
funds. ^
In summary, the economy of Lesotho has incurred social costs in 
form of a higher volume of national savings foregone and higher cost 
of finance to borrowers, as a result of the absence of relatively more 
important and efficient indigenous financial institutions. However,
1, "Report to the Cuban Government; of the American Technical Mission
to "Cuba" Federal Reserve Hull ; . Vol. 28, no.8 (August 1942) p.775.
.2, ftsillch, H.C., Monetary Problems of An Hx'ort Economy (Cambridge, 
Harvard. University Press 1960) p. 43
3. Lwankwo, G. 0., "Indigonisation of Nigerian Banking" The Bankers’
Magazine Vol. 214 ( July 1972) pp. 15 - 21.
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this social cost must ultimately be traced to the lack of a central 
reserve bank equipped to act as an effective lender of last resort.
Once an indigenous financial system has emerged the allocation 
and control of credit has to be socially optimum. For one of the 
key purposes of a central bank equipped to regulate the movement of 
money and capital funds is to capture all investible surpluses and 
direct thorn towards na' ional development according to the national 
development plan.
Many developing countries have employed differential discount 
rates., portfolio ceilings, differential reserve requirements linked 
to the composition of bank portfolios and import deposit requirements 
in an attempt to reallocate credit optimally from a development point 
of view,^ There is no doubt that credit has boon misallocated in 
Lesotho from a social point of view. This must be so because the 
foreign private banks which are responsible for over J C f J o  of domestic 
credit expansion are guided >y the profit motive rather than social gain.
1* Trimmer, A.F. "Central Banking and Economic Development"
"Journal of Money. Credit and Banking, (llovembcr 1971) PP« 780—'792* 
particularly "pp, ~ f 8 6 - 7 b 9 *
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lesotho does not possess one of ti^ p most powerful tools of monetary
1
solicy - the foreign exchange rate. The Government of Lesotho cannot 
devalue or revalue the currency or resist such ch: nges in the interest 
of the Lesotho economy.
It has been argued that there is no balance of payments "problem" 
in a dependent economy such as that of Lesotho. 1 This argument correctly 
refers to the problem, of finding means of financing a deficit. The Ministry 
of Finance in Lesotho need not worry about where to get foreign exchange 
to finance the deficit. However, the process of adjustment in the balance 
of payments deficit results in the reduction in economic activity,
2employment and money incomes since the exchan e rate is fixed immutably.
The social costs of this deflationary adjustment process should not be 
underestimated in an underdeveloped economy with a large unemployed 
population.
According to the theory of optimum currency areas, 1 if labour 
car. move freely from the depressed (Lesotho) to the prosperous member of 
the currency union, the social cost .involved here would be reduced. In 
that case, the currency area can be regarded as optimum or ideal. The 
situation is that because of job reservations for whites and general 
apartheid laws and practices, the free mobility labour, especially from 
Lesotho to South Africa is extremely restricted. ....
1. Greaves,I. Colonial honerary Conditions, (H.II. S. G, , 1953),
and A Hazelwood, "Economics of Colonial Monetary Arrangements" 
Social and hcon'.mic Studies Vol. 3, Hoc 3 and 4, 1954.
2. Thomas, C.Y. "The Balance of Payments .nd Money Supplies of a Colonial
Monetary Economy, "Social . n rlco: i - Studies Vol. 12, 1963.
a* Mundell,R.A. " A Theory of Optimum Cia ency Areas," American Eeoncmi# 
Review Vol. 5? no. 4. (September, 1961) pp. 657-665.
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Advance deposits on imports i-s another monetary instrument connecter 
 ^ . vith the exchange rate which has been employed by several under­
developed economies to correct balance of payments deficits, to promote
1economic development or to maintain domestic monetary stability.
jjuai exchange rate system has also been used by several underdeveloped
2countries as an instrument of industrial development. Before introduction 
of a local currency in Botswana foreign commercial banks and other 
financial institutions could not be prevented from employing huge surplus 
funds outside the economy. After introduction of exchange controls, 
foreign balances of the institutions dwingled.
All these instruments have had some favourable effects on the eo^homy 
of countries possessing currency issuing central ‘banks. Therefore 
there is no reason why Lesotho should not.benefit from.possession of 
the same instruments.
Planning for economic development is now widely regarded as an 
instrument of economic policy. However intelligible planning requires 
adequate statistical data and economic and financial analysis of relevant 
variables. The free flow of goods and services on one hand and payments 
and receipts on the other between Lesotho and South Africa makes collection 
of statistical data extremely costly and impossible in some cases.
1. Brimmer, 1971, op.cit. pp - 788-789, Birnbaum.E.A. and M.A. Qureshi,
"Advance Deposit Requirements for Imports,” IMF’ Staff Papers 
Vol. - 8, 1960/61, pp. 115 - 125.
2, Kahnert, F. et al. Economic Integration Among Developing Countries
(Paris , 0-E~C-lA 1969) pVl07
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The introduction of a localscurr ncy in Lesotho will not only make 
it possible to collect more adequale data but will also enable the authorities 
to undertake more significant economic and financial research. Every 
central bard: the world over has a research department* and y u
- uy uni 1,
" The relevance of central banks to economic planning 
derives from the fact that nowadays they are almost 
everywhere regarded as being* in some sense* part 
of the governmental structure and are expected tc 
contribute to the formulation of national economic policy, "1
Being unable to create money and credit* the Government of Lesotho 
cannot be expected to con+rol money and credit. This is why it has been 
said that indigenous monetary policy is not possible in a country without 
its own currency* , This does not mean that monetary and credit
conditions in Lesotho do not change. Changes in the monetary policy of 
Soui>h Africa designed to deal with economic conditions in that country 
influence the cost of borrowing* availability of credit and the price 
level in Lesotho,
The writer believes that a greater scope for monetary control existed
than the authorities recognised or were willing to ex ercise. For
example, Lesotho could have had a banking legislation of its own
immediately after political independence directed'- at the control of two
2foreign commercial banks. Such a law could have codified the investment
1, Loynihar, LI, "The Role of a Central Bank, M In Economic Planning and
The Banking Systems Proceedings of a Seminar of the 21st 
Internati ~ nal Br.r.kin. ~ B : r School (Dublin* Institute
of Bankers in Ireland* ± J ’ :). pp, 13-27, especially p. 14.
2, The relevant Financial Institutions .,ct Bo, 23 of 1973 was finally 
introduced in 1974, near, p ten years after political 
independence.
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policy of these foreign banks, even-though it is more difficult for the 
Government to do so then a central banking authority, A few examples 
of the potential monetary policy instruments in the absence of a 
central banking authority can be cited.
Moral suasion by the Minister of Finance or the Prime Minister has 
been used in Lesotho. The foreign banks have been asked through speeches , 
the National Development Plans and articles in the press. This weapon 
has not had much effect(if any) basically because the Financial institutions 
involved are foreign and bound by their couhtry1 s laws and head 0-Li.ices 
to follow an investment policy which suits the interests of their share­
holders, even if such a policy goes against Lesotho national development 
objectives.
For example, after the Government of Lesotho had written tc the 
foreign financial institutions to change their ivestment behaviour in 
the interest of Lesotho from which they collect savings, two of the 
foreign financial institutions replied.'*'
:fIn response to your recent request that we should 
investigate the feasibility of investing in Lesotho 
we have to advise that our investment policy,which 
is formulated by our parent company in the United Kingdom, 
does not permit us to invest in territories outside the 
Republic of South Africa. (Security Life Assurance 
Corporation Ltd- 12th October,1976).n
" Cur investment policy, which is laid down by our 
chief office in London, does not permit us to invest 
funds outside the Republic, (The Prudential Assurance 
Company Ltd—14-th October 1976). ,T
indigenousy
There is no doubt, ho- ver, that if these institutions were / 
moral suasion would have ' : much more effective than has been the oase#
Gurr,R. (Zd. ) Transr.r~ rotations and Developing Countries;
Proce i. n w a: nee held at Maseru, ( March 23-25, 1977)
Another possible instrument^01 monetary policy in oho absence of
a centr-. I bank is liquid Assess ratio see os; anied bts ceil i nr s on liquid
assets ratio and crei..ix flooi's on a discriminator,' Dosis* x^ .e - int-;n^ i<al
Institutions Act 1973 provides for minimum liouid assets ratio, the
naximum naturity of these assets being set at 370 days. The Act, however,
does not provide for liquid assets ratio ceilinrs and credit : 1oors in
^articular sectors of the economy such as agriculture.
The net result is that the banks affected by the Act hold most of
their deposix liabilities in foreign assets which are legally included
in the liquid assets ratio. Since the introduction of the liquid assets
ratio, the commercial banks in Lesotho have generally maintained excess
2liquid assrts of over 100$ of the required ratio. This provision has 
therefore'the effect of ensuring•liquidity in order to meet sudden wide 
withdrawals' of deposits but this monetary policy instrument has little
Offset (in any) on the amount of commercial bank credit channelled into
I ' • . • • - • .iagriculture or indigenous industrial enterprises,
I •The main point- here is that some monetary policy is possible in 
Lesotho. However, from an economic development point of view a more 
meaningful and effective monetary policy is impossible without the appropriate
j
monetary authority - a central bank.
i
The openness of the economy of Lesotho will impose limitations on
effective monetary > olicy even if a local currency is introduced. However,
*
limited independent monetary policy is better than none at all. Once
1. Financial Institutions Act, 1973? Section 22.
2. Registrar of Financial Institutions, "Annual 'Repor1 9 1 9 76, p.8,
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the country possesses the instruments of independent monetary management,
innovations can always be made to make monetary policy more effective.
In any case, monetary independence should be regarded as an important
attribute and symbol of national identity and sovereignty.
There is an important cost connected with lack of monetary management.
It is often said that use of the Rand enables Lesotho to save on manpower
which is one of the most crucial factors constraining development, llhat
is not recognised is the fact that by not running an independent monetary
acquiring
system, the country is foregoing the opportunity of / ' expertise
in monetary matters. The result is that ten years after political independenc 
the country still has ‘bo rely heavily on foreign monetary experts, most 
of whom are unfamiliar with local conditions.
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The next task is to examine the gains Lesotho receives from the
use of a foreign curmenoy as a domestic medium of exchange.
One of the benefits which is associated with a common currency
is that the larger the area within which a monetary unit circulates f reely,
the greater the benefits from the use of money (and specialization)
1
accruing to the are. as a whole, Within the larger currency area, 
transations costs and. costs are lower than in a smaller one. Factors of 
production move more freely ssking higher returns. This results in greater 
allocative efficiercy and higher degree of integration of the member 
countries. However, It must be pointed out that these gains from formation 
of currency areas do not always accrue to all members of the currency area 
equitably,
Lesotao ^as teen a-heavy exporter of capital to the South African 
money and capital market. The benefit from reduction -in costs of transfer
of -these funds and interest income is much less than the opportunity cost
capital so transferred. On the goods and services account,costs of
of«.transactions between Lesotho residents and South African residents ' \
are indeed lower than they would have been if exchange c°ntiCl existed 
between the two countries. However, the free inflow of goods and services 
into Lesotho - the less industrially developed country •
_ has subyc-c-tofl
ruinous competition on infant industries in this country. This is the case 
even though the 1969 Customs Union Agreement between Botswana, Lesotho,
South Africa and Swaziland and the 1974 Monetary Agreement between Lesotho, 
South Africa and Swamiland Governments do include clauses which give the 
less developed members of the orea ■ owers to restrict the outf1ow of capital
lunds to and the inf1 ow of certain goods and services from the more
, , , 2 aevelopeu member.
1, BosjP.C. Money in
pp. 60—6
2. The 1969 Customs Unior Agreement,Article.6. The 1974 Rand Monetary
Agreement  ^Artie]_e _ 3,
Ill 50I1E BENEFITS C-F THE FOREIGN CURkEilCY SYSTEM
Bevel01 went '.otterdam,Rotterdam University Press, 1969), 
1 •
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In summary, exchange costs, exchange risks, and the inconvenience 
thereof are smaller in a larger monetary area than in a smaller one.
However, the opportunity costs of free capital outflow and Iree commodity 
and services inflow with respect to Lesotho are muoh greater than the gains 
mentioned here. That is why partial monetary-and customs unions have 
been formed in most integration schemes involving countries at different 
stages of economic development, such as those in Southern Africa,
Another benefit to Lesotho of the use of the Sand currency is 
said to come from the strength of this currency and its international 
acceptability. It is said that because Lesotho is a small developing economy 
it does not have the resources with which to issue and manage a stable 
currency of its own. Therefore, Lesotho, is said to be fortunate in that 
her medium of exchange is, from her point of view, a "ready-made” strong one. 
The strength of the Rand derives from two sources? competent and experienced 
management of the currency and a high gold content of official reserves#
What benefits flow from a "hard" currency? Such a currency is
expected to induce an inward flow of private foreign investment and attract 
1foreign tourists. Since currency is a medium of savings, in xne sense
that current consumption of goods and services is foregone in order to 
acquire it, a very strong currency must make the public confident to save 
by holding it. However, the beneficiary of these hard savings is not the 
economy of Lesotho but the South African economy which is ultimately response 
for issuing the currency. As for the inflow of private foreign investment, 
this did not happen to any significant degree until quite recently, Sven 
then, the bulk of the inflow of private foreign investment 1Snot necessarily
1* Johnson, H. G., Further L'sc . in Monetary Economics (London, George
*’ Allen & Unwin 1972) p# 23
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sensitive to currency stability or lack of it because whether the Lesotho 
currency is weak or not, as long as rich diamond pipes are available in 
commercially exploitable quantities, foreign private investment will come 
in. Rhomberg has also argued that currency depreciation has very little 
role to clay7' in the deflection of direct and equity foreign ivestment 
from developing economies, 1
The strength of the Rand must not be over-estimated. In fact, there 
have been two devaluations in five years. The policy of apartheid and its 
effects have in the past caused a massive outflow of funds during the 
Sharceville massacre, for example. In several quarters pressures have 
been mounting against South Africa’s racial policies and this could well 
result in the weakening of the currency. In summary, the .strength of the 
Rand has gains but most of the gains accrue to South Africa in absolute and 
relative terms. Since the strength of a currency also depends on the 
domestic policies of respective countries, there is no reason why an 
independent currency in Lesotho should not be sound and well managed.Ij
The most important real benefit which Lesotho has derived from the
t
membership of the Rand monetary area is the economy realised from the
2pooling cf foreign exchangers serve s. ~ The larger the • currency area, 
the wider the domain of risk-sharing according to the insurance principle, 
Lesotho’s saving from this must be substantial since the country’s export
leceipts from wool/mohair and ..Train sales are subject to wide fluctuations.t
For this reason the country would have had to keep a larger stock of foreign 
exchange reserves if she had her own national currency,
1, Rhomb erg, R, R*,’’Private Capital Movements and Exchange Rates in Level opin
Countfies. ” IMF Staff p.-,; ,7ol. 13a966«pp 1-23.
2, „ Newly n, W. 1,.. Monetary- Syste •" tibnj ’’ The East Africa a Economic
Review hoi. 1 1, no. i, (June 1 -) t a), pp. 41-53, especially p. 51*
3, Mundell, R., "Uncommon Argument for Common Currencies '" In Johnson,H. G. A.
and A, Swocoda (lids.), ho Economics of Common Currencies (London, 
George Allen &  Unwin LtdTTJTTJ cFapter 77
IV SUMMARY AID CONCLUSIONS
This study has been concerned with an analysis of the current monetary
system of Lesotho using the cost—benefit approach. It was chov.ni that even
criterion
from the single / point of view, the currency area to which Lesotho
belong s is not :optimum. This country has had to bear the cost or burden 
of adjustment alone in the absence of common incomes, employment and pricing 
policies in the area. Labour mobility has been severely restricted basically 
by the racist practices of South Africa. Capital mobility has been quite 
high but has tended to move from the depressed Lesotho to the more prosperous 
- South Africa,
We also examined the costs of the absence of an institution with 
powers to create money and credit. The cost of acquiring foreign currency 
was found to be heavy. The use of the Hand foreign currency as a domestic
medium of exchange and store of value means that every money using person
in Lesotho holds a certain amount of foreign exchange reserves. As a 
result, the benefits of importation of capital goods have been foregone.
The economy involvejd in pooling the Rand foreign currency reserve at
the central bank has been lost. Yet, a certain quantity of currency in
circulation does not have to be obtained by giving up real resources to 
foreigners. Mainly due to institutional factors, the currency supply was 
seen to be less elastic than required for an economy subject to wide fluctua­
tions in sales of domestic produce. Virtually all central banks, being 
monopolists in their business, are making some profits. Therefore, Lesotho 
has foregone this almost guaranteed net income.
Lesotho has been lending capital funds to South Africa at almost 
zero rate of return until 1972* A social cost is also involved in the 
absence of a lender-of—last—resort, a function which was first performed 
Dy what is now called a central bank. The cost of borrowing by the Government
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of Lesotho is higher (fflaan is possible under central banking.
Lesotho is deprived of the foreign exchange' rate instrument which 
has been used successfully by other developing economies to promote 
economic development. The underdevelopment of the indigenous financial 
institutions has been explained partly by the absence of a central reserve 
bank. As a result a higher level of national savings and a more optimum 
allocation of financial resources have been foregone.
Although some monetary action was possible but not fully utilized* 
generally the monetary system does not permit a relatively more independent 
monetary policy. As a result* there is no deliterate monetary policy 
directed at domestic employment, the price level, monetization and economic 
development in general. Instead, the economy is influenced by foreign 
monetary policy actions unrelated to the domestic economic and financial 
conditions.
Against the above social costs has to be weighed the benefits of
I
Lesotho’s foreign domesticated monetary system. Although the benefits
I • . .
of use of money grow with the size of the common currency area, it has been 
shown that these benefits are very likely to polarize onto the richer member 
of the currency area . away from Lesotho. A partial currency union would 
have benefited Lesotho much more than has been the case. Even the benefitsi
Df the use of a ’’hard*' currency have not been distributed proportionately,I
In any case, there is no doubt that Lesotho could take appropriate measures
to maintain a reasonably stable currency, like . many other developing
small countries have done, 
most
The/imPortant single benefit Lesotho derives from the currency union 
is the econ omy
/involved in the pooling of foreign exch, nge reserves other than the Hand 
reserve which is held by every money-using resident of Lesotho,
The assessment of the net social benefits or costs is made extremely 
difficult by the unmeasurability of certain items* The problem of quanti­
fication of the variables involved is compounded if we look at the issues 
from a dynamic point of view. Yet, decisions to remain within a common 
currency area or to break off have been taken on the basis of eve^ less 
rigorous assessment of the social costs and benefits than we have been able 
to do here. Our general conclusions are that the social costs of Lesotho1s 
dependent monetary system exceed the social benefits*. There is therefore 
a good economic case for a more independent monetary system.
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